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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This is an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, from a final
order, entered by the Honorable J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge for the
Third Judicial District Court In and For the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, wherein the

said

court denied

and dismissed

husband's post decree Order to Show Cause, In Re: contempt and for
payment of lien interest in real property, and dismissal of
husband's petition to modify, and

said appeal

is authorized

pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code Annotated, as amended
in 1992, and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

The trial court below failed to duly order that the wife

should forthwith pay husband his vested lien interest in said
marital residence, the "trigger events" being inequitable as a
matter of law. The standard of review is a mixed question of law
and fact, and reviewed for correctness by the appellate court with
no deference to the lower court court's determination or the
conclusion reached by the trial court. Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P2d
669 (Ut. 1985).
2.

The trial court below improperly denied husband's order

to show cause In Re: Contempt and for an order compelling the wife
to forthwith pay husband his vested lien interest, and an order
dismissing the husband's petition to modify. Thereby denying the
husband his opportunity to present evidence of a substantial
1

material change of circumstances that may support an order for
modification of the decree as requested. The standard of review is
a question of fact. The trial court abused it discretion. See,
Janse v. Janse, 748 P2d 1249 (Utah, 1989).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Annotated provides in pertinent
part as follows, that:
"the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders... the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary";
and by analogy, contrast and comparison,
Section 30-3-5(5), Utah Code Annotated provides in pertinent
part as follows, that:
"unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise,
any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that
former spouse; however if the subsequent marriage is annulled
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall
resume from the prior marriage only if the party who was
ordered to pay alimony in the previous proceeding is joined in
the pending annulment action so that party's rights can
properly be determined"; emphasis added
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
The wife, was granted an default divorce pursuant to her
complaint on or about the 20th day of April, 1983. The husband, was
properly before the Third District Court in said proceeding, he
having duly executed and filed a waiver therein.

The Divorce

Decree provided, among other things, that the wife be awarded the

2

marital residence of the parties' subject to a "shall pay" lien
interest in favor of the husband in the sum of Twenty Four
($24,000.00) Dollars. The said lien interest shall be due and
payable to the husband when either of the following contingencies
first occurs:
"when the home is sold"; or
"six years after the wife remarries".
The wife married one Denna Landon Scott, the 8th day of
August, 1986. On or about the 20th day of October, 1987, the said
marriage to Mr. Scott was annulled by the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 864904250. The husband
was not made a party to said annulment proceeding.
On or after the 8th day of August, 1992, the six year
condition for payment of husband's lien interest, as ordered by the
divorce decree, had occurred. The husband made timely demand on the
wife for payment of said lien interest. The husband contended that
the triggering condition for the payment of his vested lien
interest in marital property had occurred, to wit: wife had married
Mr. Scott on the 8th day of August, 1986, and husband made demand
for payment of said lien interest on or after the 8th day of
August, 1992. The wife has refused and continues to refuse to pay
to the husband the vested lien interest.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The husband filed an order to show cause, In Re: Contempt, and
For an order directing the wife pay the vested lien interest
3

awarded to him pursuant to the divorce decree entered herein. The
husband also filed a Petition to Modify.
DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT
Husband's order to show cause came on regularly for hearing on
Friday, the 30th day of October, 1992. The Third District Court
Domestic Relations Commissioner recommended the following, that:
the wife, not be found in contempt of court; the foregoing was
based on a finding that neither of the court decreed "triggering
events" that created a duty for the wife to forthwith pay husband's
vested lien interest had occurred, and that husband's petition to
modify was dismissed.
The husband objected to the recommendation of the Third
District

Court

Domestic

Relations

Commissioner,

and

not

withstanding said objection, said recommendation became the order
in the case on the 23rd day of November, 1992, and it is from the
Third District Court's order denying husband's right to be paid his
vested

lien interest in the marital estate, and the court's

dismissal of husband's petition to modify, that the within appeal
is taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court below erred or abused it discretion by failing
to order the wife to pay husband his vested lien interest in the
marital residence as a matter of law. The "triggering events"
ordered by the court in the decree are exclusively in the control
4

of the wife and therefore inequitable as a matter of law.
The trial court below did have jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders in the instant case pursuant to Section 30-35(3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended. The Husband herein was
improperly denied his day in court to introduce evidence to show a
change of circumstances that may support an order for modification
of the original decree herein.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and independent therefrom, in
the event the within court finds that the award of the residence to
the wife is deemed to be an award other than alimony, i.e. a
property award, division or distribution, then, in that event,
absent a controlling provision of law, the terms of the divorce
decree are controlling. In the instant case the divorce decree sets
forth the "triggering events" that gives rise to the duty for the
wife to pay the husband. The "triggering event" of "when the
residence

is

sold"

is

clear

and

unambiguous.

However,

the

"triggering event", the subject of the within appeal, of "wife's
marriage to another plus the passage of Six (6) years," is subject
to numerous interpretations. What is "marriage to another" and must
it be solemnized? The language does not require that the wife be
married for Six (6) years, what if marriage ends before six years
has

elapsed:

permanently

by

divorce;

the

estranges himself

new

spouse

dies,

deserts

or

from the wife; or what if the

marriage is annulled?
There is statutory law in Utah that in the case where a
5

divorced spouse is receiving alimony and subsequently marries
another, absent an exception in the divorce decree, alimony, by
operation

of

law, terminates, and

the

alimony

can

only

be

reinstated if the party previously ordered to pay alimony is made
a party in the annulment proceeding, and the court so orders the
terminated alimony reinstated. Likewise, and by analogy, the same
rule as set forth in Section 30-3-5(5) Utah Code Annotated, as
amended

1952,

should

apply

to

property

divisions

that

are

conditioned on the obligor spouse's marriage to another. To rule
otherwise is to create an unreasonable classification.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT I
WHEN INTERPRETING A DECREE, PARTICULARLY IN DIVORCE
PROCEEDING, THE IMPORTANT OBJECT IS TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE COURT THAT ISSUED THE DECREE
Counsel for the husband was unable to discover Utah case law
that specifically addressed the issues raised on appeal. The
dissenting opinion in Chandler v. West, 610 P2d 1299, 1302 (Utah,
1980), stated the correct and proper rationale that the court must
apply when

interpreting decrees, and the property

settlement

provisions set forth therein, Justice Maughn, at page 1302 of his
dissenting opinion, citing Cain v. Cain, 575 P2d 468 (Haw, 1978),
and Cain, ibid, was more fully expanded by Hana Ranch, Inc. v.
Kunakahi, 726 P2d 1023 (Haw. App., 1986), holds:
Interpretations or construction of a judgment, decree or order
presents a question of law, a trial court's interpretation or
6

construction is not binding on an appellate court and is fully
reviewable on appeal.... when interpreting a decree,
particularly in a divorce proceeding, the important object is
to carry out the purpose and intent of the court that issued
the decree.
The purpose and intent of the divorce decree in the instant
case, and all other divorce proceedings, among other things, is to
make an equitable division of the parties' marital property at the
time of the granting of the divorce decree. See, Miller v. Miller,
683 P2d 319 (Ariz. App., 1984). At the point of entry, said decree
specifically awarded the husband in the instant case a vested
interest in the marital residence in the sum of $24,000.00, to be
paid in the future, and that interest so awarded did constitute an
immediate, present and vested separate property interest. See,
Koelsch v. Koelsch, 713 P2d 1234 (Ariz, 1986). The foregoing cited
case dealt with retirement benefits, but its holding is applicable
to the delayed "pay-out" of the vested lien interest in the marital
residence in the instant case. The court in the Koelsch, Ibid, held
at page 181, that:
"It is well settled principle that one spouse cannot, by
invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the
community property interest of the other spouse."
In the instant case the condition(s) for

"pay-out", as

previously set forth are as follows: "when the property is sold";
or "when the wife remarries and the elapsing of six (6) years
following said marriage". It is submitted that both conditions are
unequivocally in the control of the wife. As a matter of law the
distribution scheme in the instant case is inequitable. See, Hardin
7

v. Hardin, 788 P2d 1252 (Ariz. App., 1990).
In the Hardin, case ibid, at page 1255, the "triggering
event", similar to one in the instant case, was "when the property
is sold", the court held that:
"the effect of the trial court's award was to give appellant
an immediate separate property interest wholly within the
control of the appellee".
Hardin, ibid, at page 1255, goes on to cite Chrane v. Chrane,
649 P2d 1384 (NM. 1982), which speaks directly to the remarriage
issue, when it held that:
a lien against the former family residence payable upon the
sale of the house or the ex-spouse's remarriage or death was
an inequitable distribution of the community estate. The court
went on to reason: The net effect of leaving the home to the
wife until she remarries or dies or decides to sell it, is to
divest the husband of his equity in the property. In fact, he
may never live to receive any portion of that equity.
The court in Hardin, Ibid, at page 1255, went on to further
hold that substantial time delays are also per se inequitable, even
if the possessing spouse pays interest, the interest issue was not
a provision that was part of the decree in the instant case, see In
Re: Marriage of Salter, 609 P2d 374 (Ore. App., 1980).
It is undisputed that the purpose and intent of the court in
the instant divorce proceedings, was among other things, to make an
"equitable division" of the marital estate of the parties herein.
The parties, were at the time of the entry of the divorce decree
without minor children, without any other type of continuing
entanglement that would justify the inordinate delay in the "payout" of husband's vested lien interest herein, and yet, more than
8

ten (10) years have elapsed since the date of the entry of the
divorce decree herein. The husband's vested lien interest, as
recognized by the court at the time of entry of the divorce decree
and subsequent hearings herein, was and is the sum of $24,000.00.
From the time of entry of the decree and subsequent hearings
thereon, there remains no time certain outside the exclusive
control of the possessing party, the wife, as to when said vested
lien interest must be paid. Such unilateral control over the
"triggering event" is inequitable at law, and clearly fails to meet
the purpose and intent of the court in such proceedings.
The court below erred or abused it discretion by failing to
order that the wife forthwith pay the vested lien interest to the
husband, and by dismissing the husband's Petition to Modify, and
said orders should be reversed. Also under Section 30-3-5(3) Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, when the wife's remarriage to Mr.
Scott was annulled, the court could have considered ordering Mr.
Scott to pay husband his vested lien interest if wife had so
requested.
ARGUMENT II
AS A GENERAL RULE, ORDERED ALIMONY TERMINATES
UPON THE REMARRIAGE BY THE RECEIVING SPOUSE, EVEN
IF THE SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE IS ANNULLED
The legislature in the State of Utah has enacted statutes that
mandate procedures for handling certain post decree alimony issues
that are not within the scope of the provisions of the divorce
9

decree itself. See, Section 30-3-5(5) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, provides in pertinent part as follows, that:
"unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise,
any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that
former spouse; however if the subsequent marriage is annulled
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall
resume from the prior marriage only if the party who was
ordered to pay alimony in the previous proceeding is joined in
the pending annulment action so that party's rights can
properly be determined"; emphasis added
Likewise, case law has held as follows, that:
. . . alimony terminated upon remarriage; and that it was not
automatically re-instated by the annulment, see Russell
v.
Russell, 587 P2d 133 (Utah, 1978, citing Ferguson v. Ferguson,
564 P2d 1380 (Utah 1977).
In the instant case the provisions of the decree provided the
terms as to when the vested lien interest was to be paid to the
husband. The wife married another, one Denna Landon Scott, on or
about the 8th day of August, 1986. The wife's subsequent marriage
was annulled, on or about the 20th day of October, 1987, however
notwithstanding the annulment, and as proscribed by the terms of
the divorce decree previously entered herein, Six (6) years had
elapsed since the marriage of the wife to Mr. Scott and husband's
demand for payment of his vested lien interest from his former
wife. If the husband's vested lien interest is deemed by the within
court to be alimony, or in the alternative, if not deemed to be
alimony, it should be treated the same or similarly thereto by
analogy, and the foregoing statute, i*e. Section 30-3-5(5) Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended would then be dispositive of the
10

disputed issues herein.
In the proceedings below, the trial court erred or abused its
discretion when it dismissed husband's Order to Show Cause In Re:
Contempt and Why Wife should not be ordered to forthwith pay
Husband's Vested Lien Interest. The said order of dismissal should
be reversed and the wife should be found in contempt of court, and
punished accordingly, and it should be further ordered that the
wife forthwith pay the husband his claimed vested lien interest in
the sum of $24,000.00, together with reasonable interest thereon.
See, Eames v. Eames, 735 P2d 395 (Utah App., 1987), the court in
said case held, at page 399, as follows, that:
When a residence is a major marital asset, it has become quite
common to order it sold and the net proceeds divided. It is to
be expected that the equity share of the spouse who does not
have the pre-sale use and benefit of the residence will accrue
interest at some reasonable rate, even though the interest
might not be payable until the sale proceeds are available.
ARGUMENT III
MARITAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
OF DIVORCE DECREES ARE SUBJECT TO THE
CONTINUING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The trial court below does have continuing jurisdiction to
change, make a new or modify existing orders previously entered as
provisions of a divorce decree. Said orders of modification can be
entered to modify provisions relating to distributions of marital
property, see Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, which provides in pertinent part as follows, that:

11

"the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders... the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary";
The case law, when interpreting said section, held in Chandler
v. West, 610 P2d

1299, 1300

(Utah, 1980),

and

subsequently

reaffirmed in Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P2d 57 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), that:
"property settlements are entitled to greater sanctity than
alimony and support payments in proceedings to modify divorce
decrees." the court went on to emphasize that "property
settlements are not sacrosanct and are not beyond the power of
a court of equity to modify."
Notwithstanding the alleged clarity of the "triggering events"
language, the husband is entitled to his day in court on the issue
of whether

there has been

a substantial

change of material

circumstances subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree not
contemplated at the time of the entry of the decree that would
allow the court below to modify the provision or provisions as
requested. See Muir v. Muir, 200 Utah Adv. Retp. 41 (1992) (Citing
Jense v. Jense, 748 P2d

1249, 1251

(Utah App.

1989),

Cert

dismissed, 795 P2d 1139 (Utah, 1990); Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P2d
393, 394 (Utah, 1985) (per curiam).
The trial court below erred or abused its discretion when it
dismissed husband's Petition to Modify in the proceedings below,
and said order of dismissal should be reversed and the husband's
Petition to Modify reinstated forthwith.

12

CONCLUSION
The court below should be reversed. The wife should be ordered
to forthwith pay to the husband his vested lien interest in the
marital residence in the sum of $24,000.00, plus interest thereon.
As a matter of law, the provisions of the decree that proscribed
the "triggering events" were and are inequitable. The "triggering
events" were each in the exclusive control of the wife.
The court below should be reversed. The husband's petition to
modify was improperly dismissed, and it should be reinstated
forthwith. The trial court below did have continuing jurisdiction
to hear husband's petition to modify. The husband is entitled to
present his evidence to prove a material substantial change of
circumstances that may justify a modification of the decree herein.
The court below should be reversed. By analogy, the annulled
remarriage of the wife and the payment of the vested lien interest
of the husband, should be subject to the same statutory provisions,
i.e. Section 30-3-5(5) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, as
termination of alimony by remarriage. It is submitted that for the
purposes of the property settlement the "act of marriage" is
sufficient to terminate, or as in the instant case, "trigger"
payment, unless the party claiming the relief as a result of the
marriage is made a "party in interest" in the annulment proceeding.
The within case can be decided on the following four factors:
1.

The lawful marriage of the Mr. and Mrs. Watts to one

another.
13

2.

The lawful default divorce of the Watts from one another.

3.

The Utah

Statute Section

30-3-5(5) enacted to give

validity and to protect the first divorced spouse (Mr. Watts) in
the event of remarriage of the former wife (Mrs. Watts) to another,
and thereafter the wife cohabited as husband and wife with the new
husband, and after so residing for more than one year obtained an
annulment.
4.

The Utah

Statute

Section

30-1-4.5

enacted

to give

validity to an non solemnized marriage relationship created not
withstanding the lawful technicality the solemnized remarriage was
defective through no fault of the first husband, Mr. Watts.
DATED this

/ 7 ^

day of May, 1993.
["FULLY SUBMITTED

foRGE<^9. /^EARLfiy/
Attorney for tlher
Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

day of May, 1993, that

Two (2) true and correct copies of APPELLANTS BRIEF, were duly hand
delivered to counsel for the Appellee at the following address:
THOMAS R. KING
Attorney at Law
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

ADDENDUM

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance
and health care of parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circum-

:

stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall
consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
\, (6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if
it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made
; and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
{ the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the pre•; vailing party in that action, if the court determines
j , that the petition was without merit and not asserted
| in good faith.
iwi

30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according
to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a
contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties,
and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one
year following the termination of that relationship.
Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be
proved under the same general rules of evidence as
facts in other cases.
1987

1252

Ariz.
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that occurred prior to and were independent of the taint of the unlawful invasions,
waa permissMe, We beJieve the SBme is
true in this case.
Although the state could argue that testimony of the officers about the delivery of
the marijuana would be permissible because no Fourth Amendment violation was
involved to that point, events from the time
of the entry of the officers into the home,
as well as the fruits of their search of it,
were properly suppressed. Failure to suppress would, as appellee points out, completely emasculate the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment because
probable cause is usually based on independent information obtained by the officers.
To allow them entry into a home without a
warrant would eliminate any protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
The suppression order of the trial court
was proper.
LIVERMORE, P.J.,- and LACAGNINA,
J., concur.
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In re the Marriage of Richard Allen
HARDIN, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Patricia HARDIN, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 88-586.
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1, Department B.
March 1, 1990.
Husband appealed from judgment of
the Superior Court, Yuma County, Cau^e
No. 54999, H. Stewart Bradshaw, J., entered in dissolution proceeding. The Court
of Appeals, Voss, P.J., held that: (1) trial
court's determination that wife was "in
need of assistance," together with its consideration of parties' relative financial posi-

tions and wife's station in life as the result
of marriage, was sufficient to support
award of spousa) maintenance, but (2) judgment dividing community property which
gave husband lien on family home, payable
upon sale of property, improperly deprived
husband of his vested property interest in
community.
Remanded.
1. Divorce <S=>286(3)
Review of order awarding spousal
maintenance is limited to determining
whether trial court abused its discretion.
A.R.S. § 25-319.
2. Appeal and Error «=>907(2)
Without transcript of trial, Court of
Appeals was required to assume that evidence presented to trial court was sufficient to support it findings. 16 A.R.S.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 11(b).
3. Divorce <3=>237
Husband's failure to contribute to family finances prior to dissolution was inappropriate basis upon which to award spousal maintenance. A.R.S. § 25-319.
4. Divorce <3=»237
Trial court's determination that wife
was "in need of assistance," together witih
its consideration of parties' relative financial positions and wife's station in life as
the result of marriage, was sufficient to
support award of spousal maintenance.
A.R.S. § 25-319.
5. Divorce <3=*252.3(2)
Trial court's division of community
property need not be exact, but it must
result in substantial equity.
6. Divorce <&=»252.3<2)
Upon dissolution, community property
is divided such that each party receives
immediate, present, and vested separate interest.
7. Divorce &=>252.5(3>
Judgment dividing community property which gave husband lien on family
home, payable upon sale of property, improperly deprived husband of his vested

HARDIN v. HARDIN
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interest in community, where date of sale
was not specified in order.
A.R.S.
§ 25-318.
Bruce Yancey, Yuma, for petitioner-appellant.
Community Legal Services by Michael
Figgins, Yuma, for respondent-appellee.
VOSS, Presiding Judge.
Appellant raises two issues for our review. First, whether the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding spousal maintenance to appellee; and second, whether the
trial court failed to make an equitable division of the community estate in awarding
appellant a judgment enforceable by a
"non-specific" lien on the family residence
awarded the appellee. We affirm the trial
court's award of spousal maintenance, but
reverse and remand with respect to the
division of the community estate.
Background
Appellant and appellee were married
February 17, 1985. During the course of
the marriage, the parties purchased a family residence in Yuma, Arizona. On October 20, 1987, appellant filed a petition for
dissolution in Yuma County. The matter
was tried to the court and an order setting
forth the court's ruling was filed September 14, 1988. Appellant's motion to reconsider was denied. A decree of dissolution
was filed December 9, 1988. Appellant appeals from both the denial of his motion for
reconsideration and the underlying judgment.
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lant's failure to adequately, help with family expenses prior to the dissolution. Appellant asserts that he paid a substantial portion of the family expenses and that therefore trial court's factual conclusion is incorrect.
[1] The trial court's grant of spousal
maintenance is governed under A.R.S.
§ 25-319.1 An award of spousal maintenance is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Battiste v. Battiste, 135 Ariz.
470, 662 P.2d 145 (App.1983); In re Marriage ofHinkston, 133 Ariz. 592, 653 P.2d
49 (App.1982). Our review is limited to
determining whether the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding spousal maintenance. In re Marriage of Bergert 140
Ariz. 156, 680 P.2d 1217 (App.1983).
The trial court made the following findings in an order dated September 14, 1988:
6. The Respondent has requested that
she receive spousal maintenance. The
record shows that the Petitioner contributed no funds to pay community debts
for a period of several months, except to
pay some $345.00 on the home property.
7. The Respondent is in need of assistance. The Petitioner is capable of
earning for [sic] in excess of what he is
presently earning. The Respondent's
need and station in life in which Petitioner placed her should require that the
Petitioner pay to the Respondent the
sum of $200.00 per month as and for
spousal maintenance for a period of thirty months beginning October 1, 1988.

Spousal Maintenance
The trial court awarded appellee $200 per
month for thirty months for spousal maintenance. Appellant argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in basing the
award of spousal maintenance on appel-

[2] Appellant failed to provide this
court with a transcript of the trial court
proceedings. See Arizona Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(b). The
record in this appeal consists of the parties'
briefs and a copy of the clerk's file. Without a transcript of the trial, we must assume that the evidence presented to the
trial court was sufficient to support its

I. A.R.S. § 25-319 states in pertinent part:
A. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation ... the court may
grant a maintenance order for either spouse
for any of the following reasons if it finds that
the spouse seeking maintenance:

1. Lacks sufficient property, including
property apportioned to such spouse, to provide for his or her reasonable needs.
2. Is unable to support himself or herself
through appropriate employment ... or lacks
earning ability in the labor market adequate
to support himself or herself.
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findings. Renner v. Kehl, 150 Ariz. 94,
722 P.2d 262 (1986).
[3] In awarding spousal maintenance it
appears that the trial court found that appellant failed to contribute to the family
finances for some period prior to dissolution. While this might be a proper consideration in dividing the community property,
we believe it is an inappropriate basis upon
which to award spousal maintenance. See
Buttram v. Buttram, 122 Ariz. 581, 596
P.2d 719 (App.1979) (spousal maintenance
does not encompass settlement of property
issues). Were this finding relied on exclusively for the award, we would be inclined
to reverse. However, in addition to this
finding, the trial court stated other findings which we believe focus on issues properly concerning maintenance.
[4] The trial court noted that the appellee was "in need of assistance." While this
language is broad, we believe it is sufficient under either A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(l) or
(2) as indicating an insufficient property
base or inadequate labor skills with which
appellee could support herself. The trial
court also noted the parties' relative financial positions and appellee's present station
in life as a result of this marriage. All of
this is appropriate initially for determining
the need for spousal maintenance. We
again note that the trial court is given wide
latitude in awarding spousal maintenance
and we will not interfere unless a clear
abuse is shown. In re Marriage of Hinkston, 133 Ariz, at 593, 653 P.2d at 50. We
are unable to say, with the record before
us, that the trial court clearly abused its
discretion.
Division of Community Property
In dividing the community property, the
court awarded appellee the family home
and appellant a lien thereon. The lien was
set in an amount equal to one-half the net
sale price of the family home or the sum of
$17,500 whichever is less. The trial court's
order did not provide a date upon which the
2. A.R.S. § 25-318(A) states that the trial court
"shall ... divide the community, joint tenancy,
and other property held in common equitably,
though not necessarily in kind. .." A.R.S.

lien was to be paid, nor did it provide for
interest.
Appellant argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in dividing the community estate by awarding appellant the
"non-specific" lien. Appellant contends
that a lien which does not contain any
provision as to when it may be realized
fails as an equitable division of property
under A.R.S. § 25-318.2 We agree.
[5, 6J The trial court's division of community property need not be exact, but it
must result in substantial equality. Miller
v. Miller, 140 Ariz. 520, 683 P.2d 319 (App.
1984). "In exercising its discretion the
court has to award a substantial equivalent
to each spouse because an uneven distribution unconstitutionally deprives the spouse
of a vested interest." 3 CM. Smith & I.
Cantor, Arizona Marriage Dissolution
Practice § 323, at 360 (1988). Upon dissolution, community property is divided such
that each party receives an immediate,
present, and vested separate property interest. Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176,
713 P.2d 1234 (1986).
Our supreme court stated:
It is a ''settled principle that one spouse
cannot, by invoking a condition wholly
within his control, defeat the community
interest of the other spouse." In re
Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal.3d 779,
786, 582 P.2d 96, 100, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 13
(1978). This principle has even stronger
applicability when the property wholly
within the control of another is the separate property of an ex-spouse. See In re
Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal.3d 418,
423, 629 P.2d 1, 4, 174 Cal.Rptr. 493, 496
(1981).
Id. at 181, 713 P.2d at 1239. While
Koelsch involved retirement benefits, we
believe the logic of the quoted section is
sound and applies herein.
[7] The trial court intended to give the
appellant a separate property interest
equal to one-half the value of the family
§ 25-318(C) allows the court to "impress a lien
upon the . property awarded to either party
in order to secure the payment of any ... equity
the other party has in or to such property
"
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residence. To secure this interest the trial
court awarded appellant a lien apparently
payable upon sale of the property, the date
of which was unspecified. The effect of
the trial court's award was to give appellant an immediate separate property interest wholly within the control of appellee.
Such an arrangement is not contemplated
by A.R.S. § 25-318 and is denounced by
Koelsch.
We note that other jurisdictions have declined to allow similar, even less egregious
liens on judgments. In Marriage of Salter, 45 Or.App. 555, 609 P.2d 374 (1980),
the Oregon Appellate Court held that an
interest bearing judgment enforceable by a
lien payable fifteen years after its inception
was an inequitable distribution of community assets. That court modified the trial
court's award to include monthly payments
within a reasonable period after the dissolution and shortening the time in which the
entire judgment was to be satisfied.
In Chrane v. Chrane, 98 N.M. 471, 649
P.2d 1384 (1982), the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that a lien against the former
family residence payable upon the sale of
the house or the ex-spouse's remarriage or
death was an inequitable distribution of the
community estate. The court reasoned:
The net effect of leaving the home to the
wife until she remarries or dies or decides to sell it, is to divest the husband of
his equity in the property. In fact, he
may never live to receive any portion of
that equity.
Id. at 472, 649 P.2d at 1385.
We hold that the trial court's failure to
give form and substance to appellant's lien
results in an unequal property distribution
which is arbitrary, unreasonable, and a
deprivation of appellant's vested property
interest in the community. We therefore
remand for proceedings consistent with oui
holding.
JACOBSON and KLEINSCHMIDT, JJM
concur.
NUHlIji SYSTtM^

<(!)

